with heavy and continued attacks hy fire directed against the disoersed and relatively iaolated firebases and strongnoints of the It was anticipated that the 3rd Division would be singled out for some unspecified special attention, largely because it was a relatively new and untested combat unit. All authorities also pointed to the possibility of a large, but undefined, enemy offensive sometime in the summer, perhaps to influence the US presidential election campaign and to lend impetus to enemy proposals at the Paris Peace Talks, It wis not anticipated, however, by any source available to me prior to March 30, that the enemy general offensive would occur so early and would take the form, in Quang Tri, of a multidivision invasion across the DMZ and from western areas of the Province, Again, I am speaking of estimates as to most likely courses of action, not the broad spectrum of enemy eapabiliti«:i, As^.e^nments of eneiry capabilities were accurate; estimates of most likely courses of action were not.
The difficulty at the tljne, however, was that in all categories of information there was no preponderance of believeble and persuasive items sunoortlng the invasion alternative, or any other alternative, and an objective evaluation of the available information did not inexorably lead to one conclusion in lieu of all the others. The "maximum effort/invasion" items ajnounted to a comparatively small fraction of the available information. And in all cases, the timing of any enemy dry seasou campaign was never specified 
